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The global apparel industry forms an integral part of the world trade. In developing countries, 
apparel accounts for a large proportion of total exports. India is one among the developing 
countries that have emerged as a major sourcing destination for Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs) in the last few decades. According to the World Trade Organization (2016), India is the 
fifth largest apparel exporter in the world, with 19 billion USD worth of apparel exports 
annually. Despite industry’s economic and employment potential, incidences of poor working 
conditions and labor standard violations have been reported routinely (Nimbalkar et al., 2015). 
The highly scattered and multi-layered structure of the Indian apparel industry (Mezzadri, 2014) 
contributes to the failure of MNEs’ compliance regulatory policies, which are implemented 
mainly in the form of code of conduct (CoC). However, the compliance behavior of Indian 
apparel supplier firms is little known and this study was designed to gain an understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms affecting supplier compliance with MNEs’ regulatory policies. 
Etzioni’s compliance theory (1975) explains the role of superiors’ power and subordinates’ 
motivation in achieving compliance with organizational standards. Other researchers (Yukl, 
1998; Bharadwaj, 2011) have also supported that power and motivation are the two potential 
factors affecting compliance. Specifically, two power strategies: hard powers, defined as the 
strategy based on enforceable rules supported by threats or negative consequences; and soft 
powers, refers to the strategy where individuals feel free to decide whether or not to accept the 
inﬂuencer’s requests (Pierro, Raven, & Cicero, 2008) were hypothesized to affect suppliers’ 
motivations: intrinsic, defined as the motivation to engage in work primarily for its own sake 
since the work itself is interesting and satisfying; and extrinsic, defined as the motivation to work 
primarily in response to reward or recognition or the dictates of other people (Amabile, Hill, 
Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994). Finally, the suppliers’ two forms of motivations would affect 
monitoring (refers to the process of regular surveillance, verification, and inspections of CoC 
implementation practices); and transparency, defined as the accessibility of information 
concerning business practices, and full disclosure of information to all the stakeholders (Reich & 
Samet, 1996).  
A quantitative study, involving face-to-face surveys of apparel manufacturing/exporting factories 
from Delhi (India) was designed to test above hypotheses. Due to difficult-to-reach population, 
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purposive sampling technique was used to recruit participants. One participant from each factory 
was selected. Specifically, respondents who were currently employed in apparel export factory, 
and involved in managing social compliance-related issues within the factory were recruited. A 
market research firm, Nextgen, collected data during Spring 2017. Total 210 usable survey 
responses were collected. Finally, Structure Equation Modeling (SEM) was conducted.  
The demographic description of the sample revealed that majority were males (89.5%), with 
average of 18 years of work experience in current factory, and has completed college degree 
(88%). The manufacturing units’ firm size was small-to-medium (with an average of 234 
employees) (Mezzadri, 2014), mainly involved in manufacturing women’s apparel (91%) 
(Bhullar et al., 2015), and products manufactured were exported to multiple countries. Initial 
screening of the Cronbach’s alpha values of five latent variables showed that all values were 
within the acceptable limits (0.6<α<0.7) as suggested by Kline (2000), except for soft power 
strategies (Cronbach’s alpha=0.443). Thus, it was removed from the model. Analysis of 
demographic characteristics of the study samples indicated that the demographic information of 
participants was in accordance with earlier studies. Further analysis of the remaining items in the 
measurement model showed a good model fit (χ2=236.098, df=142, p=0.000, CFI=0.896, 
TLI=0.874, RMSEA=0.056, SRMR= 0.062). All factor loadings were found to be positive (>0.4) 
and statistically significant. Final analysis of the structural model indicated a good model fit 
(χ2=232.225, df=143, p= 0.000, CF=0.901, TLI=0.882, RMSEA=0.055, SRMR=0.069). Results 
of the structural model (see Figure 1) supported four hypotheses, with exceptions to the effect of 
hard power on intrinsic motivation, and the effect of 
intrinsic motivation on monitoring. 
This study indicates that buyers seem to use hard power 
strategies, which induces extrinsic motivation in 
suppliers. However, with stimulation of extrinsic 
motivation in suppliers, buyers could influence only 
suppliers’ monitoring mechanisms but not transparency 
mechanisms, since the latter relies more on inculcating 
intrinsic motivation in suppliers as found in this study. 
Based on these findings, it can be concluded that 
inducing both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in 
suppliers is important for buyers to achieve suppliers’ compliance performance. Overall, this 
study contributes uniquely to the literature by offering a deeper insight into the interactive nature 
of the buyer-supplier compliance-influencing process. To overcome limitation of this study, in 
the future, research on other apparel clusters from different regions of India is recommended.  
Figure 1: Results of all hypotheses tested 
(*** represents p-value <0.05; β represents 
standardized parameter estimates).  
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